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WALTER H. MC LAUGHLIN, JR. 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§20.1. Hearsay rule: Excited utterance exception. Out-of-court 
statements made by persons while under the influence of an exciting 
event are likely to be made before there has been time for reflection 
and fabrication. If so made, they possess a sufficient guarantee of 
trustworthiness so that the trial judge, in his discretion, can admit 
them as an exception to the hearsay rule.1 The usefulness of this ex-
ception in Massachusetts has heretofore been extremely limited by the 
requirement that the statement be contemporaneous with the exciting 
event. This requirement was applied as early as 1857. In Lane v. 
Bryant,2 a bystander was allowed to testify at trial concerning a state-
ment made by the defendant's servant. The statement, made after the 
accident occurred, indicated that the plaintiff was not to blame. In re-
versing, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the evidence, since 
it did not accompany the principal act, was only an opinion of a 
past occurrence and no more competent because it was made im-
mediately after the accident than if made a week or a month after-
ward. Subsequent cases followed this rule and required that the state-
ment be contemporaneous to the act.3 
In Rocco v. Boston-Leader, Inc.,4 the Supreme Judicial Court up-
held, as within the trial court's discretion, the exclusion of a state-
WALTER H. McLAUGHLIN, JR. is a member of the firm of The McLaughlin 
Brothers, Boston, and an Instructor of Law at Boston University Law School. 
§20.1. 16 Wigmore, Evidence §1750 (3d ed. 1940). 
275 Mass. 245 (1857). 
3 E.g., Ronkin v. Brockton Public Market, Inc., 257 Mass. 6, 153 N.E. 97 (1926); 
Eastman v. Boston and Maine R.R., 165 Mass. 342, 43 N.E. 115 (1896). 
4340 Mass. 195, 163 N.E.2d 157 (1960). 
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ment made not more than a second or two after the accident. In 
dictum, however, the Court intimated that in the future it might 
abandon the requirement that to be admissible a statement must be 
contemporaneous with the act: 
With respect to spontaneous utterances the guiding principles 
have been stated - and in our view correctly - by Prof. Wig-
more: "The utterance must have been before there has been time 
to contrive and misrepresent .... It is to be observed that the 
statements need not be strictly contemporaneous with the excit-
ing cause .... "5 
During the 1967 SURVEY year, the Court in two holdings confirmed 
the dictum in the Rocco case and in effect overruled the earlier cases. 
In Commonwealth v. Hampton,6 the deceased victim, Thomas Tur-
ner, was stabbed in his second-Hoor apartment. Four to five minutes 
later he knocked on the door of an upstairs apartment and in re-
sponse to a question said: "Call the police, my wife stabbed me."7 
This statement was admitted by the trial judge as part of the res 
gestae. The Supreme Judicial Court held that excited utterances made 
before the speaker has time to reHect and contrive are admissible even 
though not contemporaneous with the event. Applying this test, the 
Court refused to reverse the ruling as an abuse of discretion, noting 
that the out-of-court declarant had just received serious wounds and 
was in a state of shock.S 
The new test was adhered to in Hetel v. Messier's Diner, Inc.,9 
where the defendant excepted to the admission of the following 
statement made by a waitress just after the plaintiff fell: "Oh, my 
God. I told the other girl to clean this mess up ten or fifteen minutes 
ago."10 The Court rejected the contention that it was a mere recital 
of a past event, reasoning that the trial judge could have found it 
was made spontaneously even though not contemporaneously with the 
fall. The Court, therefore, refused to reverse the trial judge's exercise 
of discretion. 
§20.2. Hearsay rule: Exception for statement of present mental 
condition. Commonwealth v. DelVallel casts grave doubts on the 
admissibility, in a murder case, of the victim's statements to witnesses 
that the defendants had threatened to kill him. It is clear that since 
these statements were made out of court and were offered for their 
I) Id. at 196-197, 163 N.E.2d at 158. 
6351 Mass. 447, 221 N.E.2d 766 (1966). 
7Id. at 449, 221 N.E.2d at 767. 
S Although not discussed in the opinion, it would appear from the facts of the 
case that the statement would also be admissible as a dying declaration if it could 
be shown that the victim was aware of impending death at the time the statement 
was made. 
91967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 385, 223 N.E.2d 922. 
10Id. at 386, 223 N.E.2d at 923. 
§20.2. 1351 Mass. 489, 221 N.E.2d 922 (1966). 
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truth that they were hearsay. The Commonwealth argued that the 
statements should be admitted under the exception to the hearsay 
rule that out-of-court statements indicating the state of the declarant's 
mind may be properly admitted. The trial court admitted the state-
ments on this basis, reasoning that they showed, at the time they were 
made, that the victim was afraid of the defendants. The prosecution 
relied on Commonwealth v. Trefethen2 to support its position. In 
Trefethen, the victim made statements to a medium the day before 
her death that she was contemplating suicide. The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the exclusion of these statements by the trial court 
was improper. 
On the surface, it might appear that the DelValle case and the 
Trefethen case are similar. In Trefethen, evidence of intent to com-
mit suicide was offered by the defense to negate murder, and in 
DelValle, evidence of threats was offered by the prosecution to ne-
gate the theory of suicide. When analyzed in terms of the hearsay 
dangers and the alternatives for other satisfactory evidence, how-
ever, the two cases are quite different. An expression of intention to 
commit suicide is the best evidence available that an individual is so 
disposed, and a jury can very properly infer that someone with that 
intention did in fact carry it out in the future. The inferential link 
between a state of mind and future action carried out by the actor 
alone, based upon his state of mind, is direct and easily followed. 
The situation in the DelValle case is much different. Here the vic-
tim is not speaking directly about his own state of mind. The trier of 
fact is to determine the effect on the victim's mind of actions by other 
parties. While these actions of other parties might have affected his 
state of mind, and thus raise the inference that he did not commit 
suicide, they were independently relevant to the principal issue in the 
case. The fact that the defendants threatened the victim leads to the 
inference that the threats were carried out. The jury could not be 
expected to confine the relevance of the statements to the victim's 
state of mind. Such statements, therefore, should not have been ad-
mitted. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reached essentially this result in a 
somewhat circuitous manner. The evidence was admitted as part of 
the Commonwealth's case in chief and without a cautionary instruc-
tion to the jury limiting the statements to proof of the deceased's 
state of mind prior to death. Thus, the Court held the admission of 
the statements as prejudicial, as the jury would likely view the state-
ments as support of the defendants' guilt rather than as rebuttal of the 
decedent's suicide. The Court further noted that the threats were im-
material to the issue of the decedent's suicide. 
§20.3. Confessions and admissions. Johnson v. New Jerseyl left 
2157 Mass. lBO, 31 N.E. 961 (IB92). 
§20.3. 1384 U.S. 719 (1966), also noted in §9.B supra. 
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to the discretion of the states whether to apply Miranda v. Arizona2 
retrospectively. The Supreme Judicial Court, in several cases, has re-
fused to give Miranda retrospective effect.3 In Massachusetts, there-
fore, Miranda applies only to cases which are tried after June 13, 
1966. While Miranda requires obvious changes with respect to inter-
rogations and the admissibility of confessions, the application of the 
case to admissions by silence and admissions of a co-defendant may 
raise some difficult problems. Four cases decided during the 1967 
SURVEY year indicate the problems that may arise. 
In Commonwealth v. McCambridge,4 the Court approved the ad-
mission of testimony by a police officer who arrived at the scene of 
an automobile accident immediately after it happened and observed 
the defendant and the victim engaged in a violent struggle over a gun. 
The officer testified that as he opened the door the victim said: "He's 
got a gun. He just shot me."5 Later, when asked in the presence of 
the defendant what happened, the victim said: "The son of a b .... 
pulled a gun on me."6 It appeared from the instructions later given to 
the jury that the trial judge admitted the accusatory statements and 
the failure to deny the accusations as an admission by silence. The 
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the admission of this testimony as 
an admission by silence, refusing to apply Miranda retrospectively.7 
It would appear, however, that the admission of such statements is 
doubtful in post-Miranda cases. The rule of admission by silence re-
quires a defendant to affirmatively deny an accusation.8 If he fails to 
do so, testimony as to the accusation and the refusal to deny will be 
admitted into evidence.9 Clearly, if a defendant's right to silence, as 
guaranteed by Miranda, is to be meaningful, it should not be sub-
verted by requiring him to deny the accusation, on penalty of ad-
mission of the accusation and refusal to deny into evidence. 
Ironically, it would appear from the facts of the case that the state-
ments were admissible on two separate theories, both of which had 
nothing to do with admissions. They could have been admitted as 
excited utterances which were part of the res gestae,lO or they could 
have been admitted, after proper foundation had been laid, as a 
dying declaration.11 
The case of Commonwealth v. McGrath,12 decided the same day as 
the McCambridge case, is a more striking example of the necessity of 
limiting the admissions-by-silence exception in order to make Miranda 
2384 U.S. 436 (1966). For an intensive discussion of Miranda, see §20.4 infra. 
3 E.g., Commonwealth v. Morrissey, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 11, 222 N.E.2d 755. 
41967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 23, 222 N.E.2d 763, also noted in §9.6 supra. 
5Id. at 24, 222 N.E.2d at 764. 
6Id. 
7Id. at 26-27, 222 N.E.2d at 765. 
8 See Commonwealth v. McGrath, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 41, 44, 222 N.E.2d 774, 775. 
9Id. 
10 See §20.l supra, note 1. 
11 See 6 Wigmore, Evidence §§1432-1437 (3d ed. 1940). 
121967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 41, 222 N.E.2d 774, also noted in §9.5 supra. 
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meaningful. The defendant, McGrath, was charged with assault with 
a dangerous weapon upon a girl with whom he had been living. At 
the trial, the girl refused to identify him as her assailant. A neighbor 
and the police made accusatory statements to the defendant at the 
police station. The defendant, who did not then have counsel, made 
replies which did not admit the accusations but did not categorically 
deny them. The trial judge admitted the accusations and the equivocal 
replies into evidence under the admissions-by-silence exception. The 
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction, again refusing to ap-
ply Miranda retrospectively. 
Five months later, in Commonwealth v. Freeman,13 the Court 
showed greater concern for the damage a defendant can suffer from 
the misuse of the admission-by-silence doctrine. The facts in this 
case differed from the facts in the above cases in that the accusation 
was made by a complaining witness at the police station in the 
presence of the defendant's lawyer. An innocent individual in the 
presence of counsel is not likely to speak up to refute the accusation. 
The admission-by-silence doctrine should, therefore, not apply when 
the accused was in the presence of his counsel. The trial judge, how-
ever, admitted testimony as to the accusation and charged the jury 
that they might consider the police station identification as an ad-
mission by silence. The Supreme Judicial Court considered the error 
sufficiently harmful to reverse the conviction, despite the fact that the 
defendant's counsel did not protect him by excepting to the charge. 
The Court, in dictum, indicated that even had the attorney not been 
present, the doctrine of admission by silence would not apply,14 in-
dicating that the Court will, to a limited extent, adhere to the policy 
underlying Miranda, even though Miranda was not specifically ap-
plied. 
In addition to casting grave doubts on the admissions-by-silence 
exception, Miranda raises questions concerning the admissibility of a 
co-defendant's confession, when such a confession implicates the de-
fendant. When the two defendants are tried together, the prosecu-
tion can place this confession before the jury as an admission by the 
party who made it. The defendant who did not make the confession 
is entitled to an instruction that the jury is not to consider this evi-
dence against him, but as every experienced trial lawyer knows, juries 
are not capable of such mental gymnastics. For all practicable pur-
poses, except the directed verdict situation, the evidence is going to 
be considered against the second defendant by the jury. 
This situation arose in the case of Commonwealth v. Grant15 where 
the trial judge gave the proper limiting instructions, but the defen-
dant's lawyer objected on the ground that the two cases were being 
tried together. 
13 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 879, 227 N.E.2d 3, also noted in §9.8 supra. 
14Id. at 885, 227 N.E.2d at 8. 
151967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 721, 226 N.E.2d 197, also noted in §9.4 supra. 
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The proper procedure on the part of defense counsel would not be 
an objection at trial, but a motion to sever the cases before trial. 
This had not been done in the instant case. The Supreme Judicial 
Court upheld the conviction, resting its decision on the ground that 
the other party's confession was not illegally obtained. This case 
would have presented a difficult problem had a proper motion to 
sever been made. Although the granting of the motion has been held 
to be within the trial judge's discretion, it would seem, in light of 
Miranda, that the motion should be granted on the above facts. It is 
inconsistent to provide such great protection for a defendant's own 
out-of-court statements, on the one hand, and, on the other, let the 
out-of-court statements of a co-defendant become the effective means 
of convicting him. 
B. STUDENT COMMENT 
§20A. Admissibility of offered confession: Burden of proving 
coercion: Commonwealth v. Johnson.1 During the 1967 SURVEY year 
the Supreme Judicial Court was faced with the question of admissi-
bility of a confession alleged to have been coerced. Johnson had been 
arrested for the murder of a police officer during the commission of 
a robbery.2 He was put in several police lineups and questioned con-
tinuously from 9:35 p.m. until 5:30 the next morning, at which time 
he made a confession to the police. No counsel was present during 
the questioning or at the time of the statement. Johnson challenged 
the voluntariness of his confession on voir dire, contending that he 
had requested, and was denied, counsel and further, that his confes-
sion was coerced by physical abuse. The trial judge decided against 
the defendant3 and admitted the confession into evidence. No ob-
jection to the voluntariness of the confession was made upon its in-
troduction at trial, nor was a request made for an appropriate in-
struction to the jury. Johnson was subsequently convicted. 
On a motion for a new trial, based on admission of the confession 
into evidence, the trial judge made further findings that Johnson 
was not warned of his right to remain silent and that he did not waive 
such right. He also found that Johnson did not request counsel and 
did not know what his rights were at the time of interrogation.4 The 
motion for a new trial, however, based on the claim of physical abuse, 
was denied. On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court HELD: the judge's 
§20A. 1 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 581, 225 N.E.2d 360, cert. granted sub nom Johnson 
v. Massachusetts, 36 U.S.L.W. 3163 (Oct. 17, 1967) (No. 702). 
2 A co· defendant was also taken into custody and was eventually found guilty of 
murder and armed robbery. 
3 The only issue considered at the voir dire was Johnson's claim of physical 
coercion. Id. at 584, 225 N.E.2d at 364. 
4 Johnson's trial took place before the effective date of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), which held that the defendant must be informed of his rights to 
counsel before interrogation. Id. at 444. The Supreme Court has held that Miranda 
does not apply retroactively. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
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ruling, at the completion of the voir dire, that the confession was 
admissible did not deprive defendant of due process of law. The Court 
reasoned that "when the statement was sought to be introduced at 
trial, it was prima facie voluntary .... The burden was on the de-
fendant to show that the statement was not voluntarily made."5 
Under Massachusetts procedure, the question of the voluntariness 
of a confession is first raised and determined on voir dire by the trial 
judge.6 To have a confession declared incompetent on voir dire, the 
defendant must overcome an initial presumption that a confession is 
voluntarily given and must convince the court of the involuntariness of 
his statement.7 Otherwise, it will be allowed in for consideration by 
the jury. At trial, the jury will again pass on the admissibility of the 
confession, using the same presumption of voluntariness. In Johnson, 
however, the question of the validity of the confession was not pre-
sented by the judge in his charge to the jury because johnson's 
counsel apparently failed to object to the confession's introduction at 
the trial proper. 
This section will examine whether the procedure used in Massa-
chusetts for determining voluntariness of a confession presently meets 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements,S as they have 
been recently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court; and 
whether the procedure satisfied requirements in effect at the time of 
trial for cases now on appeal. Three specific elements of the Massa-
chusetts procedure will be examined to determine how they comport 
with federal due process requirements. These issues, raised by the 
Johnson case, are: (1) which party should have the burden of showing 
compliance or non-compliance with the applicable federal standards 
concerning coercion; (2) who should bear responsibility for deciding 
when the burden has been met; and (3) how heavy should the burden 
be-that is, to what degree of proof should the burdened party be 
held. These issues will be discussed first in the context of Massa-
chusetts law prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Miranda v. Arizona.9 The effect of the Miranda decision on Massa-
chusetts law will then be discussed. 
The Johnson decision was an accurate application of the Massa-
chusetts law concerning the placing of the burden.lO A confession will 
not be presumed to be the result of force or threatsll or promise of 
51967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 582, 225 N.E.2d at 363. 
6 See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 338 Mass. 460, 461, 155 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1959). 
7 E.g., Commonwealth v. McGarty, 323 Mass. 435, 438, 82 N.E.2d 603, 605 (1948). 
S "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, §I. 
9384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
10 See Commonwealth v. McGarty, 323 Mass. 435, 438, 82 N.E.2d 603, 605 (1948); 
Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 604, 48 N.E.2d 630, 639 (1943), cert. 
denied, 320 U.S. 213 (1943). 
11 Commonwealth v. DeStasio, 294 Mass. 273, 284, 1 N.E.2d 189, 196 (1936). 
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favor.12 The defendant must overcome the presumption of voluntari-
ness,13 and it is his responsibility to accomplish this by showing the 
confession was not a product of a free choice to admit or deny.14 
The second point of comparison concerns the allocation of respon-
sibility, as between judge and jury, for deciding whether that burden 
has been met. Under Massachusetts practice, the judge must make a 
preliminary determination on the issue of voluntariness15 and, if satis-
fied that the confession is voluntary, allows it into the trial, but 
charges the jury so that they may consider the question de novo.16 
This procedure, known as the "Massachusetts Rule,"17 is basically a 
hybrid of two other rules, known as the "New York"18 and "Ortho-
dOX"19 rules. Under the "New York" rule, it is the function of the 
jury alone to decide whether an offered confession is involuntary. 
The practice is to allow the confession in at the trial as long as rea-
sonable men could differ concerning its voluntairness. The judge 
then instructs the jury that the confession is to be considered only if 
the jurisdiction's voluntariness test has been met.20 Under the "Ortho-
dox" rule, the judge alone acts as finder of the fact of voluntariness 
or involuntariness. The question of admissibility is never submitted 
to the jury.21 
The Massachusetts procedure for allocating responsibility between 
the judge and jury incorporates what would appear to be the most 
desirable elements of both alternatives. Like a judge in an "Orthodox" 
rule jurisdiction, the Massachusetts trial judge hears the evidence 
bearing on voluntariness, personally resolves all factual conflicts re-
lating thereto, and makes a determination on that issue. If the confes-
sion is found involuntary, it will not be admitted into evidence. If 
found voluntary, the confession will be admitted, but with accompany-
ing instructions that the jury is to make its own independent de-
termination of admissibility. If the jury then finds it to be involuntary, 
it is to be disregarded; if found voluntary, then it is to be admitted, 
but the jury may still make allowances for weight and credibility.22 
In Massachusetts, the defendant must persuade the factfinder, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the offered confession was pro-
duced involuntarily.23 The burdened party, theoretically, must prove 
12 Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 604, 48 N.E.2d 630, 639 (1943), cert. 
denied, 320 U.S. 213 (1943). 
13 E.g., Commonwealth v. Beaulieu, 333 Mass. 640, 133 N.E.2d 226 (1956), cert. 
denied sub nom. Boisvert v. Massachusetts, 352 U.S. 857 (1956). 
14 E.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 u.S. 219, 241 (1941). 
15 Commonwealth v. Makarewicz, 333 Mass. 575, 585, 132 N.E.2d 294, 300 (1956), 
noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.4, 12.1, 22.2, 22.7. 
16 E.g., Commonwealth v. Rogers, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 29, 222 N.E.2d 766. 
17 Jackson v. Denno, 378 u.S. 368, 378 n.8 (1964). 
18 Stein v. New York, 346 u.S. 156, 172 (1953). 
193 Wigmore, Evidence §861, at 345-346 (3d ed. 1940). 
20 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 u.s. 368, 377 (1964). 
213 Wigmore, note 19 supra. 
22 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 417-420 (1964). 
23 Note, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 1069· 
1070 (1966). 
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only by a preponderance of the evidence, before either the judge or 
jury, that his confession was involuntary.24 It appears, however, that 
in practice the degree of proof needed is more like a clear and con-
vincing amount25 to offset the natural, and generally unreviewable, 
tendency to allow close cases in for the jury's assessment.26 Review of 
the trial judge's decision that a given confession is voluntary and thus 
admissible is complicated by the fact that his decision will not be 
reversed unless, from the evidence, a finding of coercion was neces-
sarily required.27 Consequently, although the trial judge is supposed 
to find a confession involuntary simply by a preponderance of the 
evidence before excluding it, there is no effective way to challenge 
his decision, except in the rare case where his decision is patently 
without support. 
The state of the law in Massachusetts governing proof of coercion 
of a confession, prior to Miranda, is that (1) the burden is on the de-
fendant (2) to convince either the judge or jury (3) by at least a 
preponderance of the evidence that his confession is involuntary. The 
question remains, however, as to how Massachusetts law comports 
with federal due process requirements. Before 1966, the United States 
Supreme Court had, from time to time, elaborated on the conditions 
and actions which would tend to establish the involuntariness of a 
confession;28 but it had carefully declined to say which party had the 
burden of proving or disproving the existence of those conditions.29 
In 1966, however, the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona.30 
The holding was later limited to prospective application only.31 Mr. 
Chief Justice Warren, delivering the opinion of the Court, indicated 
it was necessary that the defendant validly waive his Fifth32 and 
Sixth33 Amendment rights to silence and counsel for a confession to 
be admissible.34 To help ascertain whether, in a specific case, a valid 
24 In Massachusetts, preponderance of the evidence is defined as where the 
"proponent's contention is more probably true than false." Leach and Liacos, 
Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence 42 (4th ed. 1967). 
25 In Massachusetts, clear and convincing has been defined as being "greater 
than 'a preponderance' but less than 'beyond a reasonable doubt:" Leach and 
Liacos, note 24 supra, at 43. 
26 E.g., Commonwealth v. Makarewicz, 333 Mass. 575, 584-589, 132 N.E.2d 294, 
299-302 (1956) noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.4, 12.1, 22.2, 22.7; Note, De-
velopments in the Law-Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 1061 (1966). 
27 Commonwealth v. McCarty, 323 Mass. 435, 438, 82 N.E.2d 603, 605-606 (1948). 
28 See Sobel, New Confession Standards - "Miranda v. Arizona" 11-28 (1966). 
29 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 405 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part). 
30384 U.S. 436 (1966), noted in 67 Colum. L. Rev. 645 (1967). 
31 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966). 
32 "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself .... " U.S. Const. amend. V. 
33 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
34384 U.S. 444-445. The Supreme Court has defined "waiver" as "an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
9
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waiver has been made, the opinion set forth four "warnings" which 
must be given when the defendant is taken into police custody.35 
In order to be sure that the warnings have in fact been given, and 
that this point is considered at each trial, the Supreme Court as-
signed the burden of demonstrating fulfillment of the requirement to 
the prosecution.36 In addition, not only does the prosecution bear the 
burden of showing that the required warnings were in fact given, but 
it must also show that a valid waiver of the right to counsel preceded 
any statement obtained afterwards. Furthermore, the Court described 
the burden as being a "heavy" one.37 
An understanding of the impact of Miranda requires a distinction 
between the question of the voluntariness of the confession and the 
question of the voluntariness of the waiver. It is conceivable that a 
confession could have been voluntarily made, but still would not be 
admissible unless there had been a valid waiver of the rights to silence 
and counsel. In effect, Miranda holds that failure by the prosecution 
to give warning of, and obtain a valid waiver of, the stated rights is 
de jure coercion.3s Issues of coercion will henceforth arise in the con-
text of whether there was or was not a voluntary waiver after the 
required warnings. All of those circumstances, which formerly could 
be used to show coercion of the confession, will now be used to show 
that the statement or document sought to be introduced is inadmis-
sible for failure to obtain a valid waiver.3s 
In this respect, Miranda represents a major departure from the 
previous means of determining a confession's admissibility. In addi-
tion, warnings and waiver of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by a 
person in police custody, are made absolute requirements for the ad-
missibility of an offered confession. Further, a burden has explicitly 
been placed upon the prosecution to show compliance with the es-
tablished requirements. Thus, with respect to the first of the three 
points of Massachusetts law being examined in this section, it is 
apparent that federal due process requirements now place upon the 
prosecution the burden of showing that a waiver was obtained without 
resort to coercive methods. 
35384 u.S. at 467-473. 
36 Id. at 444. 
37Id. at 475. 
3S Id. at 469. This is not the same as saying that Miranda directly answered the 
question of who had the burden of showing the voluntariness or involuntariness of 
a confession. Miranda has had the broader effect of precluding that question from 
ever arising in the future. This comes about because the voluntariness of a con-
fession is no longer the criterion for admissibility. Instead the criterion is whether 
there has been a "valid waiver," i.e., a recognition of the rights to silence and 
counsel and a voluntary relinquishment of them. 
39 Thus, since the waiver is valid only if all of the prescribed circumstances were 
absent at the time it was made, then necessarily the confession following upon it 
is also voluntary. In those rare instances where the confession does not follow 
shortly after the waiver or where there is a problem of whether the waiver extends 
to all elements in the statement made, the problem is still whether there was in 
fact a waiver covering the questioned statement, not whether the statement itself 
was voluntary. 
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Since federal due process requirements are applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment,40 changes must be made in the 
Massachusetts procedure for all cases reaching trial after Miranda. 
The present Massachusetts requirement that the defendant bear the 
burden of overcoming a presumption that his confession was volun-
tary,41 must now be changed to allocate to the prosecution the burden 
of showing that the waiver was free from coercion. 
With respect to the second point, that of assigning responsibility 
for deciding if the burden has been met, an underlying presumption 
of Miranda was that the satisfying of the new procedural test was to 
be done initially before the judge, away from the jury.42 It was the 
very problem of too many incompetent confessions being admitted for 
consideration by the jury which prompted the decision in Miranda.43 
The Miranda decision did not discuss the issue of whether a jury is 
to review the trial judge's initial determination on the issue. In 1964, 
however, the Supreme Court, in Jackson v. Denno44 rejected the 
"New York" rule of allocating responsibility primarily to the jury as 
a denial of due process. The Court reasoned that in practice it was 
an impossible intellectual feat for the average juror consistently to 
separate the issue of voluntariness from the apparent truth or falsity 
of the offered confession.45 In Jackson, the Court mentioned both the 
"Orthodox" and "Massachusetts" rules and indicated that either was 
acceptable, since both provided judicial screening before the issue of 
voluntariness went to the jury.46 Federal due process requirements, 
therefore, indicate that the trial judge should have primary respon-
sibility for deciding if the prosecution's burden has been met, but that 
a jury may review that decision. On this point, therefore, Massa-
chusetts practice would appear to be in accord with the present due 
process demands. 
The Massachusetts practice would appear to be more desirable than 
the "Orthodox" rule. With a reallocation of the burden to the prose-
cution and a tightening of the degree of proof to be required, the 
Massachusetts rule is capable of providing all the protection required 
under the federal standard.47 The rule has been called a "humane 
practice,"48 "giving the defendant two chances: first before the pre-
siding judge, who may decide to exclude the statements; and then be-
fore the jury, who may disregard them."49 It would seem desirable to 
give the jury a chance to pass on the question of the voluntariness 
40 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
41 Commonwealth v. McGarty, 323 Mass. 435, 82 N.E.2d 603 (1948). 
42 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
43384 U.S. at 439, 445. 
44378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
45378 U.S. at 382. 
46378 U.S. at 378-379. 
47 "Given the integrity of the preliminary proceedings before the judge, the 
Massachusetts procedure does not, in our opinion, pose hazards to the rights of a 
defendant." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 (1964). 
48 Commonwealth v. Lee, 324 Mass. 714, 720, 88 N.E.2d 713, 717 (1949). 
49 Commonwealth v. Marshall, 338 Mass. 460, 462, 155 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1959). 
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of the waiver. The matter is a question of fact and as such comes 
within the realm of normal jury responsibility. Although the jury 
should be protected from specious confessions, it should also be able 
to disagree with the judge's finding of voluntary waiver. The jurors 
should also be able to examine the weight and credibility of evidence 
offered on the waiver issue itself, as well as the weight and credibility 
due the confession per se. Thus, the "Massachusetts" rule itself is 
essentially a desirable rule, the viability of which should be main-
tained if possible. 50 
The third point of comparison, the degree of proof required to 
establish waiver, presents greater difficulties. No United States Su-
preme Court cases, prior to Miranda, appear to have defined a stan-
dard as to the degree of proof required to establish the voluntariness 
of a confession. Jackson v. Denno offered no guidelines as to the de-
gree of proof which was required to determine admissibility of a con-
fession.51 In the subsequent case of Boles v. Stevenson,52 the Supreme 
Court again did not articulate a requirement other than to repeat the 
language of Jackson. 
In Miranda, the Supreme Court described the burden of establish-
ing voluntariness of the waiver as "a heavy burden [which] rests on 
the government .... "53 Unfortunately the Court did not go further 
to define the standard of proof that would have to be met to carry 
this "heavy burden." Nonetheless the language in Miranda indicates 
that the prosecution will be held to a high degree of proof if it wishes 
to offer a confession in evidence. 
The courts have delineated five standards of proof in determining 
the adequacy of evidence on a particular issue before them. First, the 
judge may be allowed to decide that there has been a valid waiver in 
any situation where the evidence indicates it is at least possible that 
the waiver was valid. 54 Second, he may allow the offered confession 
into evidence merely by balancing the probabilities between the con-
flicting evidence.55 Under this alternative, the proof of the validity of 
the waiver need not be inherently probable. It would only be neces-
sary that this evidence be more probable than any evidence presented 
to show there was no valid waiver. The third standard would require 
50 It is interesting to note that after its own rule was struck down, New York 
adopted the "Massachusetts" rule. People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 
179 (1965). 
51378 U.S. at 405 (Black, j., dissenting in part and concurring in part). How-
ever, after Jackson, some of the lower federal courts did deal with the problem 
and appeared split on the issue. See United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 
1965) (trial judge must find voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt); but see 
Clifton v. United States, 371 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 995 
(1967). 
52379 U.S. 43, 45 (1964). 
53 384 U.S. at 475. 
54 This amounts only to saying that, as a matter of law, it is not necessary that 
the judge find for the defendant. 
55 James, Civil Procedure §7.6, at 250 n.12 (1965). 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1967 [1967], Art. 23
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1967/iss1/23
§20A EVIDENCE 345 
that the preponderance of evidence show that it be inherently 
probable that there was a valid waiver. 56 As a fourth alternative it 
may be required that the evidence showing a valid waiver be clear 
and convincing before allowing in a resultant statement.57 Fifth, the 
judge may be held to the standard that the evidence indicating waiver 
must be certain beyond a reasonable doubt.58 In determining which 
standard is appropriate in assessing the admissibility of an offered 
confession, it must be remembered that Miranda requires the prosecu-
tion to carry a "heavy burden." 
It is submitted that only the fifth standard of proof - that the evi-
dence offered be beyond a reasonable doubt - is in accord with the 
"heavy burden" requirement of Miranda. The first three standards 
would be inappropriate under Miranda, since they would fail to con-
stitute a "heavy" burden. Instead they are similar to the standard of 
proof required in a civil action where the relative probabilities of 
the conflicting claims, rather than the particular likelihood of an in-
dividual claim, is the governing criterion. 
The choice then would appear to be between the fourth and fifth 
alternatives. The fourth alternative, a requirement that the evidence 
need be "clear and convincing," has the advantage of being a 
"heavier" burden than is usually found in civil cases. 59 As such it 
would appear to meet the Miranda requirement. There would still 
be problems, however, in using this standard. Foremost would be the 
fact that the "clear and convincing" standard has generally been 
limited in application to a few types of civil cases.60 And since the 
standards of proof employed in civil and criminal actions can be 
distinguished by the fact that the presumption of the defendant's in-
nocence plays no part in a civil case, it can be argued that the "clear 
and convincing" standard would not be directly transferrable for use 
in criminal actions. Evidence which might be "clear and convincing" 
within the framework of a civil case could be less than that in a 
criminal case, where there is the additional operating presumption of 
the defendant's innocence. Consequently, although the name of the 
test might be retained in a criminal action, it would really be a new 
test, different from that employed in civil actions. This would raise 
problems of judicial interpretation of the meaning of the test. It 
might be difficult to give some objective meaning to the standard 
which would be sufficient to distinguish it from the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" requirement. Therefore, "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
appears to be the most feasible standard to be used in proving waiver. 
Initially, it might seem that requiring the trial judge to be con-
56Id. at 250·251. 
57Id. 
58 See Leach and Liacos, note 24 supra, at 42-47; James, note 55 supra, §§7.5-7.9. 
59 This is with the probable exception of certain types of litigation such as 
will contests and disputed documents cases. Leach and Liacos, note 24 supra, at 
42-43. 
60 James, note 55 supra, at 251. 
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vinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the waiver would be too much 
proof rather than not enough. If he was sure beyond a reasonable 
doubt, reasonable men presumably could not differ with such a finding 
and he would be forced to issue a judgment non obstante verdicto if 
the jury later disagreed with him and the confession was the only 
evidence in the case. Those jurisdictions, however, which have adopted 
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard have treated the trial 
judge's certainty on the issue of waiver as certainty "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" only insofar as his own feelings are concerned.61 In 
effect, he acts as a thirteenth juror with an initial veto power. Should 
the other jurors choose to reject his finding of voluntariness that is 
their prerogative. Nonetheless, unless the judge is fully convinced of 
the validity of the waiver, the damaging statement would be ex-
cluded.62 
Miranda itself militates strongly towards a full determination of 
warnings and waivers before admission of any confession. Nowhere 
in Miranda is there an indication that the standard of proof should 
be less than the highest possible. Consequently, the requirement that 
the trial judge be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the va-
lidity of the defendant's waiver would appear to be supported by 
Miranda. 
Thus, on the third point of comparison, the degree of proof to be 
required of the burdened party, federal requirements are that the 
prosecution bear a "heavy burden," and this would appear to be most 
realistically interpreted as requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of the voluntariness of the waiver. Massachusetts presently requires 
only that the defendant persuade the factfinder by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Compliance with present federal due process would 
appear to require that in Massachusetts the prosecution must hence-
forth prove a valid waiver beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Many cases decided under pre-Miranda law are still in the regular 
course of appeal and will continue to present reviewable questions for 
several years. Since Miranda operates prospectively only,6S a confes-
sion offered in such a case would be found to be free from coercion 
if it were "voluntary" within the meaning of the tests applied before 
1966. Before 1966, the test would be directed to the voluntariness of 
the confession rather than the voluntariness of the waiver. Under that 
test, a confession would be found to be coerced only if induced by 
promise and hope of reward or benefit, or by judicial compulsion, 
violence, threats or fear, or made while the defendant was mentally 
incapacitated.64 Characteristically, in those cases the "totality of cir-
cumstances," including the above factors, was examined to see if the 
61 E.g., People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965). 
62Id. 
6S Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
64 See cases cited at 2 Underhill, Criminal Evidence 973 n.28 (5th ed. 1956). For 
a comprehensive discussion of criminal insanity, see §9.16 supra. 
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confession was the product of a "free choice to admit, to deny or to 
refuse to answer."65 
As to pre-Miranda cases such as Johnson, placing the burden of 
proving involuntariness on the defendant appears to be unassailable 
in terms of both Massachusetts66 and federal law prior to Miranda.67 
Nonetheless, although reversal might be sought in these cases on the 
ground that the burden was placed on the defendant, many states 
have historically allocated this burden to the defendant and, like 
Massachusetts, have, until Miranda, consistently followed this method 
of allocation with no federal intervention.6s This would imply that, 
as to pre-Miranda cases, allocating the burden to the defendant was 
constitutionally permissible.69 It may be argued, however, that, al-
though Miranda operates prospectively with respect to showing 
waiver of the rights to silence and counsel, it may operate retrospec-
tively with respect to the placing of the burden for showing volun-
tariness. 
Besides the pre-Miranda question of the constitutionality of giving 
the defendant the burden of proving coercion, there is the further ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the Massachusetts practice of not con-
sidering any circumstances bearing on voluntariness unless raised by 
defense counsel,7° The "circumstances" affecting admissibility are all 
part of the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.71 
In other words, there is a question as to whether a state court should 
refrain from making a complete examination of the factors affecting 
voluntariness and concentrate exclusively on the grounds urged by 
the defendant, particularly when others appear on the face of the 
record.72 Inasmuch as a confession admits all the elements of the crime, 
65 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941). Those restrictions and others 
were the product of case law as developed in some three dozen cases from Brown 
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), to Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966). 
66 Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 48 N.E.2d 630 (1943), cert. denied, 
320 U.S. 213 (1943). 
672 Underhill, note 64 supra, at 1026-1028 n.26. 
6S 3 Wigmore, Evidence §860 (3d ed. 1940). 
69 See Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 48 N.E.2d 630 (1943), cert. 
denied, 320 U.S. 213 (1943). 
70 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 581, 587, 225 N.E.2d 360, 365. 
71 Note, Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 962-998 
(1966). 
72 From the record available to the Supreme Judicial Court in Johnson, it was 
apparent that Johnson was not informed of his right to remain silent or of his 
right to counsel, and that no counsel was present during the interrogation. Further-
more, there was conflicting evidence indicating an I.Q. possibly as low as 86. Aside 
from the factor of general intelligence, Johnson was bleeding about the head and 
may have been suffering from the effects of an automobile accident sustained during 
his apprehension. In addition, he confessed after eight and one-half hours of line-
ups and interrogations. During the lineups he was repeatedly confronted by witnesses 
claiming to identify him. Bleeding about the head from scrapes and bruises, he 
must have been a remarkable sight in comparison with those standing beside him. 
All the foregoing factors were available to the Supreme Judicial Court in passing on 
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waiver of possible grounds for objection would be tantamount to a 
guilty plea. The Supreme Court has pointed out in Johnson v. Zerbst 
that waiver of a constitutional right will not be lightly inferred.73 
The right to silence would be so completely circumvented by admis-
sion of an involuntary confession that the failure of trial counsel to 
explicitly specify some of the circumstances from which coercion 
would be inferred should not be considered sufficient to have them 
excluded from further consideration.74 Where facts sufficient to negate 
a finding of voluntariness were available at trial and on appeal, even 
if introduced for other purposes, due process should require that they 
be included in the consideration of the voluntariness issue. 
For cases now on appeal, even if the burden is left on the defendant 
to show coercion, that should not alter the fact that once the vol un-
tariness issue has been raised on voir dire, there are numerous fed-
erally recognized circumstances which, if relevant, should be con-
sidered to determine whether the voluntariness test has been met. It 
might seem anomolous, with the burden on the defendant, to have the 
court consider factors additional to those raised by the defendant's 
counsel. There is, however, nothing inherently improper with the 
court's considering all relevant factors, even those not raised by the 
defense counsel, while leaving the burden on the defendant. 
In summation, federal due process requirements governing admis-
sibility of a confession require that the prosecution bear a "heavy 
burden" to show that the accused made a valid waiver of his rights 
to silence and counsel. That burden, both before judge and jury, 
would best be characterized as requiring proof "beyond a reasonable 
doubt." For post-Miranda cases, the Massachusetts procedure for de-
termining voluntariness must be altered to comply with the federal 
standard. This will mean shifting the burden to the prosecution and 
requiring that the federal standard of proof be met. The present 
Massachusetts practice of allowing the jury to review the trial judge's 
decision on admissibility is acceptable and strong policy reasons favor 
its retention. For those cases on appeal and tried under pre-Miranda 
decisional law, there are still possible due process deficiencies traceable 
to the Massachusetts procedure for determining voluntariness of a 
confession. 
JAMES COYLE 
the trial judge's decision to admit the confession, and to the trial judge on the 
motion for new trial, yet neither ruling indicated any acknowledgment of those 
factors. Brief for Appellant at 34-38, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 1967 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 581, 225 N.E.2d 360. 
73 304 U.S. at 464. 
74 Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
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